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Credit growth in Turkey: 




After witnessing the most severe crisis of its recent history in 2001, the Turkish economy has 
rapidly recovered and is now among the fastest growing economies in the world. During the 
recovery period, inflation rate has declined sharply to single-digit levels for the first time in three 
decades. This positive trend is a consequence of tight monetary and fiscal policies together with a 
comprehensive agenda of institutional reforms. 
During the last five years, the Turkish financial system has exhibited significant structural 
changes, fundamentally altering the nature of the risks that the system encounters (CBRT, 2005). 
Yet, credit risk remains at the top of the list, and its implications on both the macro economy and 
the financial system’s stability need to be closely monitored. This paper aims to discuss the main 
drivers of the recent credit boom in Turkey and the potential problems and challenges associated 
with it. 
2. Fiscal  Consolidation and Credit Supply 
The basic problem in Turkey during the last fifteen years has been the relatively large stock of 
public debt compared with the small deposit base in the banking system. The financial crisis of 
February 2001 added 30 percentage points to the already high public debt to GDP ratio (Figure 1). 
The following two years witnessed a collapse in credit, despite a temporary rise in deposits, which 
was mainly due to high levels of deposit-dollarization and the sharp depreciation of the Turkish 
lira in 2001. 
The credit to GDP ratio, however, has recovered strongly, by a total of 8 percentage points, after 
2003. The most important driver of this rapid credit growth observed during the last two and a half 
years has been fiscal consolidation. During this period, the debt to GDP ratio fell by around 
12 percentage points, while the deposit to GDP ratio stayed roughly the same. Therefore, the 
banks have replaced government securities with predominantly private credit on their balance 
sheets. 
Between the end of 2002 and mid-2005, total credit extended by Turkish banks tripled in US dollar 
terms (Table 1). More than 90% of the total credit is extended to the private sector, while the rest 
is used by state economic enterprises and other public institutions. The rapid growth in private 
sector credit growth is also confirmed in real terms. During the end-2002-June 2005 period, 
annual average real credit growth was 19.1%. As of June 2005, the year on year increase of the 
balance is 27.4% in real terms. 
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Figure 1 
Credit, Deposits and Net Public Debt 
As a percentage of GDP 
 
Sources: CBRT and Treasury. 
 
Table 1 
Main Developments in Bank Lending 
 2002  2003  2004  June  2005 
Total Credit (Billions of US Dollars, 
Net)  30 47 74 91 
Private Sector Credit (Billions of US 
Dollars, Net)  28  44  69  86 
Private Sector Credit to Total Credit 
(%) 94.7  92.8  93.1  94.7 
Private Sector Credit to GDP Ratio 
(%) 16.7  17.1  21.5  25.2 
Real Annual Private Credit Growth 
(CPI 94=100)  –0.5 11.9 37.7 27.4 
Source: CBRT. 
 
The ratio of credit extended to the private sector to GDP shows an increasing trend after the end of 
2003. The ratio is still low compared to those of the other central and eastern European (CEE) 
countries (Table 2). As a result of decreasing public sector borrowing requirements and falling interest 
rates, the loans to GDP ratio is expected to recover further in the coming years. BIS Papers No 28  365
 
Table 2 
Private Sector Credit to GDP in Eastern Europe 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Ukraine 11.1  12.9 17.5 24.3 24.9 
Latvia 17.2  21.3  26.5 34.6 45.4 
Albania  4.6 5.9 7.3 8.4 9.9 
Bulgaria 12.6  14.9 19.6 27.4 36.7 
Lithuania 11.4  11.4 14.0 20.4 25.6 
Russia  13.3 16.5 17.7 21.0 24.5 
Belarus  8.8 8.2 8.9  11.9  13.9 
Estonia 23.9  25.2 26.9 33.1 43.3 
Moldova 12.6  14.7 17.1 20.5 21.3 
Hungary 32.4  33.7 35.8 43.0 46.0 
Croatia 37.2  42.2 50.7 54.2 57.5 
Romania  7.2 7.7 8.3 9.5  10.0 
Slovenia 36.4  38.4 38.9 41.5 46.3 
Bosnia  43.3 30.1 36.3 41.4 45.2 
Macedonia 17.8  17.6 17.7 19.5 23.6 
Poland 27.3  27.9  28.4 29.0 27.7 
The Czech 
Republic  47.9 39.6 29.8 30.7 32.2 
The Slovak 
Republic  51.3 37.6 39.6 31.6 30.6 
Turkey 24.4  20.1 16.7 17.1 21.5 
Sample 
Average 23.2  22.4 24.1 27.3 30.8 
Sources: Otker_Robe et al. (2005) and CBRT. 
 
Likewise, many developing countries around the world have been experiencing a rapid expansion of 
bank credit to the private sector in recent years. In fact, Turkey is considered a “late riser”. There are 
several reasons for the credit growth in these countries. Macroeconomic stabilization, robust growth, a 
strong economic outlook, regained confidence, bank restructuring, external borrowing and increased 
foreign participation are some of the reasons typically cited.  
In Turkey, deposits still constitute the main source of funding (Table 3). Despite the decline of their 
share, deposits are still an important source of funding. As of June 2005, the share of deposits 
declined to 60.7 percent from 64.9 percent in 2002. The significant increase in syndication and 
securitization credits plays an important role in this development. 
The pace of increase in deposits is slower compared to that of gross loans. As of June 2005, the gross 
loans to deposit ratio increased from 43.1 percent to 62.9 percent since 2002. The rise in the loans to 
deposit ratio is a positive indication that banks have been regaining their main intermediation function 
after many years of the public sector crowding-out private lending.  366  BIS Papers No 28
 
Table 3 
Source of Funds 
 2002  2003  2004  June  05 
Deposits (Billions of US Dollars)  84  111  142  153 
Deposits/Liabilities  (%)  64.9 62.2  62.3 60.7 
Gross Loans/Total Deposits 
Ratio (%)  43.1 48.2  55.3 62.9 
Securitization Credits (Billions of 
US Dollars)  2 3  4 7 
Syndication Credits (Billions of US 
Dollars)  2 3  6 6 
Source: CBRT. 
 
State owned banks 
State banks were founded for development and supportive purposes, especially for agriculture and 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). However, over time they started to create major 
distortions in the sector because of their large size and political interference in their operations. State 
banks incurred losses from their “duty” of lending at below-market interest rates.  
These losses accumulated and reached 30 percent of state banks’ total assets in 1999, increasing the 
liquidity needs of these banks. They began to meet their liquidity requirements through short-term 
financing, offering high deposit rates compared to private banks by distorting the market. This 
syndrome culminated and exploded in the 2001 crisis. 
Today, the situation for state banks has changed. After the crisis, through a bank restructuring 
process, the Treasury issued “non-cash” government securities to clear its liabilities with the banks. 
The losses due to subsidized loans now have to be shown and financed through the government 
budget that is approved by the Parliament. Otherwise, they must operate under fully commercial 
principles. Moreover, the government aims to privatize all state owned banks. The privatization effort is 
expected to result in financial consolidation and/or foreign bank participation.  
Reduced taxes on financial intermediation 
The extensive use of transaction taxes in Turkey was a major obstacle to the development of a more 
diversified financial system. Taxes on financial intermediation, the Banking Insurance and Transaction 
Tax (BITT), the Resource Utilization Support Fund (RUSF), and stamp duties used to increase 
spreads significantly. The government’s weak fiscal position had made it difficult to abolish these 
taxes, which discouraged bank-financed investments and encouraged offshore operations.  
However, taxes on financial intermediation, which were a significant restriction on extending credit, 
were either abolished or decreased. For instance, the taxes levied on loans, like banking and 
insurance transaction tax and stamp duties and fees, are no longer applied for export credits. While 
the RUSF rate for consumer loans is 15 percent, the rate for corporate loans has recently been 
reduced to zero. 
Consolidation and scale effects 
The information gathered from the experiences of other countries emphasizes that there is a 
significant financial consolidation process taking place in developed and developing countries and a 
tendency towards universal banking and oligopolistic structures. Moreover, there is still not a 
consensus on the effects of financial consolidation. It is mostly accepted that financial consolidation 
has positive effects on effectiveness, efficiency and financial stability, and adverse effects on 




  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  June  05 
Concentration
1  46.3 47.8 54.4 58.4 60.3 59.5 60.8 
Number of 
Banks  81 79 61 54 50 48 48 
1  Bank concentration is defined as the five largest banks’ share of the banking sector’s assets. 
Source: CBRT. 
 
The Turkish banking sector has experienced a significant financial consolidation process since the 
crisis. As seen in Table 4, the number of banks in the Turkish banking system has declined since the 
implementation of the new bank restructuring program after the 2000-01 crisis. In 1999, the number of 
banks was 81, and in 2004 it dropped to 48. As of June 2005, the number of banks is still 48. The 
concentration ratio confirms the continuation of the financial consolidation process. As seen in Table 4, 
the concentration ratio increased to 60.8 percent in June 2005, from 46.3 in 1999. 
Foreign participation 
With the successful implementation of the economic program, increased confidence, political stability 
and EU accession prospects, foreign bank participation in the Turkish banking system has become a 
reality after many years. 
 
Table 5 
Foreign Bank Participation 
  2002 2003 2004  July  2005 
Share of Foreign 
Banks in the Sector 
(%) 3.6  3.2  3.9  13.6 
Source: CBRT. 
 
Foreign bank participation doubled during the credit boom period. The aggressive credit policies of 
new arrival foreign banks also positively affected credit growth. As seen in Table 5, the share of 
foreign banks in the Turkish banking system increased to 13.6 percent in July 2005, from 3.9 in 2004. 
This increased share also confirms foreign investors’ increased confidence in the Turkish economy 
and may add to the pace of private credit expansion. 
3.  Disinflation and Credit Demand  
With the successful implementation of a mix of prudent monetary and fiscal policies, bank restructuring 
program and structural reforms, economic and financial stability were strengthened. These 
developments also contributed to credit expansion, mostly from the demand side, due to the 
remarkable fall in inflation and the associated reduction in nominal as well as real interest rates 
(Figure 2). 
Right after the crisis in February 2001, the instrumental independence of the Central Bank was 
approved by the Parliament, and the primary goal of the Bank was set as maintaining price stability. In 
that context, the Central Bank switched to the floating exchange rate regime and declared its new 
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Figure 2 
CBRT Policy Rate and Benchmark 
Interest Rate on Government Securities 
 
Source: CBRT. 
In 2004, yearly change in the consumer price index decreased to single digits after more than 
30  years, and most of the public believes that the ongoing recovery in inflation is not temporary. 
Inflation expectations improved significantly, and both consumer and corporate confidence were 
regained. As a result of these improvements, both investment and consumption spending that were 
deferred following the crisis started picking up and have manifested themselves in credit demand to 
the banking system. 
EU prospects and convergence expectations also played an important role in the pace of credit 
demand growth. Moreover, political stability, as well as the new three-year economic program 
announced at the end of 2004, with sound fundamentals and endorsement by both the EU
2 and the 
Bretton Woods institutions,
3 helped reduce the risk premia on all securities issued in Turkey. 
Demand by types of loans 
A key way of looking at credit growth is by the type of borrower, in particular, the distinction between 
households and companies (Table 6). There has been a substantial increase in credit extended to the 
household sector. In an environment of increasing certainty, decreasing domestic and foreign funding 
costs and inflation levels, banks began to restructure their assets, which has supported this growth in 
credit demand. Furthermore, deferred consumption expenditure, especially on durable goods, has 
been realized and has contributed to rapid credit growth. 
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Table 6 
Real Credit Growth By Borrowers  
Yearly Change, %
2 
 2002  2003  2004  June  2005 
Households (Billions of US Dollars)  4  10  20  26 
Corporate Sector (Billions of US 
Dollars)  24 34 49 60 
Corporate Sector
1 to Private Sector 
Credit Ratio (%)  85.7 78.1 71.4 69.6 
Real Household Credit Growth 
(CPI 1994=100)  2.9 72.0 79.5 54.4 
Real Corporate Sector Credit 
Growth (CPI 1994=100)  –1.1 1.9  25.9  18.3 
1  Corporate sector = private credit - consumer loans - credit cards.   
2  All items are calculated in net terms. 
Source: CBRT. 
 
The increase in corporate credit has been slower compared to household loans. The share of 
household loans surged to 30 percent of total credit extended to the private sector in July 2005, from 
14 percent in 2002. 
When consumer credit is analyzed based on subcategories, it is seen that in 2004, the fastest 
increase was in automobile loans. This is partly due to the tax incentive on new car purchases that 
was eliminated as of 2005. After May 2005, housing loans gained momentum and their share 
exceeded that of automobile loans. While all types of consumer loans increased in 2005, housing 
loans increased most. It is expected that housing loans will become more widespread and that their 
maturity will further extend. Apart from this development, with the introduction of the legal framework 




Due to high degrees of asset and liability dollarization, the currency denomination of loans is another 
key element in understanding the nature of credit growth in Turkey. Borrowing in foreign currency, 
which is related to currency risk, has generally been driven by lower foreign interest rates compared to 
domestic rates and the appreciation of domestic currency. Since customers cannot hedge against 
currency risk, exchange rate risk may translate into sizeable credit risk for the banking sector.  
As for currency composition, the share of YTL denominated loans has exceeded the share of FX 
denominated ones since 2003 (Table 7). The main reasons behind this improvement in balance sheet 
are reverse currency substitution and the preference of borrowers due to the explicit currency risk 
associated with the floating exchange rate regime. Therefore, real credit growth stemmed mainly from 
YTL denominated credits. Since 2002, FX denominated credit growth has increased by only 2 percent 
on average. However, YTL denominated credits have increased enormously: 35.5 percent on average. 
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Table 7 
Credit Growth By Currency 
  2002 2003 2004  June  2005 
Real Credit Growth (CPI  94=100)  –0.6 14.2 37.2 25.8 
YTL Denominated Credit (Billions 
of US Dollars, Net)  12  26  48  62 
YTL Denominated Credit to 
Total  Credit  41.1 54.6 64.8 68.1 
YTL Denominated Credit 
Growth (CPI 94=100)  –16.3  51.8  62.7  43.9 
FX Denominated Credit (Billions 
of US Dollars, Net)  18  22  26  29 
FX Denominated Credit to 
Total  Credit  58.9 45.4 35.2 31.9 
FX Denominated Credit 
Growth (CPI 94=100)  14.3  –12.0  6.5  –0.9 
Source: CBRT. 
 
4.  Challenges for Financial Stability 
Experience in Eastern Asia and elsewhere has shown that macroeconomic instability and deterioration 
of loan quality may be triggered by excessively rapid credit growth. Although Turkey is far from that 
point, the rapid expansion of loans may nevertheless add to the current account deficit and inflationary 
pressures. However, perceived risk of loans may be underestimated by the banks. During such 
lending boom periods, the loan quality typically deteriorates due to optimistic risk assessments based 
on the current strong economy and the higher value of collateral. From this perspective, this section 
examines the risks and opportunities produced by rapid credit growth in the Turkish banking system, 
and its macroeconomic effects. 
Changing nature of risks 
The banking sector, whose balance sheet has improved significantly since the 2001 crisis, is still 
highly exposed to government securities despite the decline of its share in the balance sheet. As of 
June 2005, the ratio of the net debt stock of the government to GDP declined to 58%. Furthermore, 
the budget deficit of the general government is expected to be around 3 percent of GDP in 2005 and 
to improve further in 2006-2008. Therefore, fiscal dominance and the associated risks on the Turkish 
financial system are expected to decline further in the future. 
Nevertheless the banking sector is now much more resilient against currency risk. The banking 
sector’s net FX short position to capital ratio is close to balanced despite the observed appreciation of 
YTL, reverse currency substitution and higher yields of YTL instruments. This can mainly be attributed 
to the floating exchange rate regime. 
Regarding credit risk, risks stemming from household loans are much less than those from the 
corporate sector. The reason for this is the fact that consumer loans have the most diversified 
customer base and an adequate collateral structure (especially for automobile and housing loans), 
which is considered as a favorable condition for credit growth in this category.  
In the real sector, the profitability of corporations has recovered, but a combination of short-term 
foreign currency debt and still limited equity capital would pose a risk. The corporate sector should 
learn to hedge their currency risk under the flexible exchange rate regime.  BIS Papers No 28  371
 
On the household side, despite presenting a decreasing trend, foreign currency assets are still 
considerable. The debt stock of households is expected to increase with the increase in consumer 
loans and enforcement of the mortgage law. 
Maturity mismatch 
The main new risk area for the Turkish banking system is the interest rate risk that stems from maturity 
mismatch and fixed rate consumer lending. In general, in emerging countries, the maturities of loans 
tend to be shorter than in developed countries, due to the lack of long-term domestic and foreign 
funding. This observation is true for Turkey as well (Table 8). 
 
Table 8 
Maturity Composition and Interest Rate Structure 
As a Share of Total Credit, % 
  2002 2003 2004  June  2005  Sample 
Average 
0-12 Months  56.2  57.6 55.7 51.2  55 
12-24 Months  17.3 14.1 17.9 21.6  18 
Greater than 
24 Months  26.5  28.3 26.4 27.2  27 
Fixed Interest 
Rate  Loans  70.2 82.3 86.2 90.4  82 
Floating Interest 
Rate  Loans  29.8 17.7 13.8  9.6  18 
Source: CBRT. 
 
Table 8 shows that the share of short-term loans is falling. Even though the majority of total loans are 
short-term (0-12 months), the share of short-term loans has decreased in 2005. The rise in the share 
of long-term loans has stemmed from consumer loans, the majority of which are longer than one year. 
However, depending on developments on the liability side, the increase in the maturity of loans could 
adversely affect the maturity mismatch problem and the liquidity risk of the Turkish banking system. 
The majority of loans are extended at fixed interest rates. The share of fixed rate loans, which was 
70.2 percent at the end of June 2002, increased to 91 percent as of June 2005, as a consequence of 
an enormous increase in consumer loans.
5 This shows that Turkish banks are becoming more 
vulnerable to unexpected interest rate increases. Within this framework, making new arrangements 
that allow floating rate consumer loans along with fixed rate ones and the use of derivative instruments 
would be beneficial for the sector to mitigate interest rate risk. 
Non-performing loans  
Even though non-performing loans (NPLs) are one of the main indicators of loan quality, they are a 
lagging indicator of banking system indicators. In Turkey, the NPL ratio has fallen since 2002 (Table 9) 
and is now at comparable levels to its peers (Figure 3). The aforementioned ratio decreased from 
17.6 percent in 2002 to 5.4 percent in June 2005. The increase in the debt-servicing capacity of 
                                                       
5   Article 10 of the Law on the Protection of Consumers (Law No: 4077), as amended by Law No: 4822, states that the 
aforementioned credit transaction cannot be changed against a consumer within the contract period. Consumers have the 
opportunity to close the loans they use prior to maturity. 
The article regarding credit cards (No 10/A) states that if the minimum payment amount declared in the account summary is 
not paid at maturity, the consumer does not enter into an obligation under any name except for the default interest (the 
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the borrowers, the effects of restructured loans under the “Istanbul Approach”
6 which was put into 
practice in the beginning of 2002, arrangements for enhancing effective risk management by 
banks and improvement in banks’ risk perceptions are the major factors that contributed to the fall 
in NPL ratio. 
The increased share of household NPLs in total NPLs stems mainly from the increase in non-
performing credit cards. Starting from the end of 2002, this ratio increased continuously from 
2.9 percent to 17 percent as of June 2005. Since there has been no significant change in the NPL 
ratio of consumer loans since the end of 2003, NPLs of credit cards are seen as the main factor 
for the increase in the aforementioned ratio. However, the draft law on credit and bank cards 
prepared by the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency includes prudential measures on 
credit cards.  
In addition to the decline in the NPLs to gross loans ratio, the provisions to NPL ratio has been 
increasing. As of June 2005, the ratio increased to 88.4 percent from 64.2 percent in 2002. This 




  2002 2003 2004  June  05 
NPLs (Billions of US Dollars)  6  6  5  5 
NPL Growth (CPI 1994=100)  –37.2 –30.1 –32.6  7.2 
NPL Ratio
2 (%)  17.6  11.5  6.0  5.4 
Household' NPL
3 to Total NPL 
(%)  2.9 2.8  11.4  17.0 
NPL Ratio for Consumer 
Loans  3.1 1.1 0.7 0.6 
NPL Ratio for Credit Cards  5.0  2.4  4.4  6.5 
Provisions to NPL Ratio (%)  64.2  88.5  88.1  88.4 
1  NPLs include loans classified as substandard, doubtful and loss. These loans are recorded as non-performing receivables 
when they are 90 days past due.   
2  NPL ratio is the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans.   
3  Non-performing loans 
(NPLs) of households include past due consumer credit and credit card obligations. 
Source: CBRT. 
 
                                                       
6    In order to rehabilitate the companies that became insolvent due to the twin crises in 2000-01, Law No: 4743 dated 
31 January 2002 on “Restructuring of Debts to the Financial Sector and Amendments to be Made to in Some Acts” was 
issued. Based on the aforementioned Law, “The Regulation on Terms Related to the Acceptance and Application of the 
Framework Agreements for Financial Restructuring” was issued on 11 April 2004 by the BRSA, and “The Financial 
Restructuring Framework Agreement” by the Turkish Banks Association was approved by the BRSA on 4 June 2002. BIS Papers No 28  373
 
Figure 3 
NPL Ratio of Selected Countries
1 
 
Source: IMF International Global Financial Stability Report, September 2005 
1  Data for Argentina are for June 2005; for Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, 
March 2005; for Brazil, Poland, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Lithuania, December 2004; for Estonia, April 2005 for 
Turkey, July 2005.  
Connected lending 
Throughout the 1990s, most private banks belonged to family-owned industrial groups. These banks 
lent to their owners and to related companies due to lax definitions of related parties and broad limits 
in relation to capital. Moreover, these private banks had heavily funded themselves from international 
markets with a shorter maturity and invested in longer maturities in either government securities or 
loans to insiders or related parties, making them vulnerable to all types of shocks. 
Following the 2001 crisis, in order to reduce credit risk, significant measures were taken which 
included revised lending limits made parallel to EU regulations, a broader definition of credit to include 
forwards, option contracts, similar derivatives and shareholding interests, and regulation of connected 
lending complemented with limitations on partnership in non-financial subsidiaries. Also, the 
recapitalization operation helped achieve a transparent picture of the credit risk of the private sector. 
Group connections and hidden exposures were identified so that more effective measures could be 
taken. The new Banking Act of 2005 includes additional regulations in this area.  
Today, connected lending is becoming less significant in the Turkish banking system. The strong and 
independent Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) monitors and controls connected 
lending. This monitoring increases the robustness of the banking system. However, it should be kept 
in mind that most of the banks taken over by SDIF (Savings Deposit Insurance Fund) have been 
banks extending connected lending. Further reductions in connected lending would improve the health 
of credit expansion. 
Deposit insurance 
The consensus among academics, policymakers and international institutions on the effects of deposit 
insurance is that it benefits overall financial stability, but also imposes costs because of the 
encouragement of risk taking and misallocation of resources. Also, due to reduced market discipline 
and moral hazard, there is an intensified need for government supervision. The case of deposit 
insurance in general, or a particular deposit insurance scheme, thus depends on the relative strengths 
of these two counteracting forces. The risk-taking effect outweighs the stability effect, at least for full 
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Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find that deposit insurance increases risk by weakening 
market discipline and encouraging excessive risk-taking. Similar results have been obtained in more 
recent studies. However, Gropp and Vesala (2001), among others, claim that deposit insurance 
decreases crisis risk by preventing bank runs due to depositor panic, and that this effect is stronger 
overall than the adverse moral hazard effects. 
In line with those two opposing views, deposit insurance has been a two-way street for Turkey. The 
introduction of full guarantees to all savings deposits after the 1994 crisis, coupled with regulatory 
forbearance in the past, inevitably increased moral hazard problems and ended with the inclination of 
banks and depositors towards taking more risks, leading to the deterioration of market discipline. 
The BRSA has recently announced its plans to gradually reduce deposit insurance to EU levels. As of 
July 2005, the full guarantee on deposits was eliminated. The government insures up to 50,000 YTL of 
savings deposits. In this way, limitation of deposit insurance will decrease risk by strengthening market 
discipline and discouraging excessive risk-taking. 
5.  Challenges for Monetary Policy 
Both in the literature and in practice, it is generally accepted that rapid credit growth poses potential 
risks for macroeconomic stability. Increased opportunity to borrow eases liquidity constraints on 
households and firms, leading to higher consumption and investment. Given the short-run constraints, 
this upward shift in credit-financed domestic demand would tend to exert upward pressure on prices in 
assets, goods and labor markets. Concurrently, demand for foreign goods - both consumption and 
investment - will rise, causing deterioration in the trade balance. Thus, a rapid increase in credit can 
put upward pressure on prices in a fixed exchange rate regime, while it may reduce international 
competitiveness and deteriorate the current account with a nominal exchange rate appreciation under 
a float. This section will discuss the macroeconomic risks and opportunities of rapid credit growth 
experienced in Turkey. 
In Turkey, GDP grew significantly during the rapid credit growth period (Table 10). In 2000, GDP was 
185 billion US dollars. Just after the crisis, it declined to 124 billion US dollars with devaluation and 
decreased demand and investment. However, after the successful implementation of the economic 




  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  June  2005 
GDP (Billions of US 
Dollars)  185 124 170 258 321 341 
Current Account Balance 
(Billions of US Dollars)  –10 3  –2  –8  –16  –13 
Private Sector Credit 
(Billions of US Dollars, Net)  45 25 28 44 69 86 
Exports f.o.b. (Billions of 
US Dollars)  31 34 40 51 67 37 
Financial Account Balance 
(Billions of US Dollars)  10  –15  1  7  18  19 
Consumer Price Index 
(Base Year 1994=100) 
(Yearly Average)  54.9 54.4 45.0 25.3 10.6  9.6 
Ex Ante Real Interest 
Rates   11.8 21.1 11.1 10.7  8.4 
Real Effective Exchange 
Rate (CPI 95=100)  147.6  116.3 125.4 140.6 143.2 159.5 
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Current account balance deterioration is observed during the same period. The current account 
balance reached a record deficit level of 16 billion US dollars in 2004, from a surplus of 3 billion US 
dollars in 2001. As of June 2005, there was a deficit of 13 billion US dollars. 
A positive development is the increasing export performance of the Turkish economy. Despite 
discussion about the negative effects of rapid credit growth on international competitiveness, the 
export performance of the Turkish economy has improved. As of 2004, exports were 67 billion US 
dollars. In June 2005, the first six-month performance was 37 billion US dollars, which increases the 
hopes of reaching 70 billion US dollars at the end of the year. 
The increase in domestic demand attracts capital inflows, which indicates higher profit opportunities 
due to increased domestic demand. It is observed that there has been a huge capital inflow during the 
rapid credit growth period. As of June 2005, the financial account generated a 19 billion US dollar 
surplus. This surplus indicates and confirms that the capital inflow is due to increased economic 
activity and higher profit expectations of foreign capital. 
Despite credit expansion, consumer price inflation is decreasing. Inflationary pressures still remain at a 
manageable level, despite the surge in oil prices. 
Another positive development is decreasing ex ante (expected) interest rates. In the credit boom 
period, although domestic demand has shown an upward trend, ex ante interest rates have been 
following a decreasing trend. As of June 2005, ex ante real interest rates declined to 8.4 percent, from 
21.1 in 2002. 
Moreover, the real effective exchange rate (CPI 95=100) indicates a strong currency appreciation 
during the credit boom period. As of June 2005, the real effective exchange rate (REER) has climbed 
to 159.5, which is a record level compared to 116.3 in 2001. 
6. Conclusions 
The rapid credit growth in emerging market economies, especially in central and eastern European 
countries, during recent years leaves policymakers with a number of difficult questions in deciding how 
to respond to the credit boom. Finding ways to reduce the risk of rapid credit growth and to improve 
the management of this boom is one of the big policy challenges in today’s new financial architecture. 
The two main drivers of the recent credit boom observed in Turkey have been fiscal consolidation and 
disinflation. The fast pace of public debt reduction and improvements in the public sector borrowing 
requirement have helped the growth in credit supply, through increased availability of funds. The 
disinflation process, however, has stimulated credit demand. So far this is a healthy credit expansion 
pattern that stems from two healthy developments on the macro side. 
As far as the microprudential aspects are concerned, the main challenge of the future will be the 
gradual implementation of Basel II in Turkey. On the macroeconomic side, the continuation of prudent 
policies with a careful eye on financial stability will be essential. 
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